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Supplemental content
IMPORTANCE The Hospital-Acquired Condition Reduction Program (HACRP) is a value-based
payment program focused on safety events. Prior studies have found that the program
disproportionately penalizes safety-net hospitals, which may perform more poorly because
of unmeasured severity of illness rather than lower quality. A similar program, the Hospital
Readmissions Reduction Program, stratifies hospitals into 5 peer groups for evaluation based
on the proportion of their patients dually enrolled in Medicare and Medicaid, but the effect
of stratification on the HACRP is unknown.
OBJECTIVE To characterize the hospitals penalized by the HACRP and the distribution of

financial penalties before and after stratification.
DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS This economic evaluation used publicly available data
on HACRP performance and penalties merged with hospital characteristics and cost reports.
A total of 3102 hospitals participating in the HACRP in fiscal year 2020 (covering data from
July 1, 2016, to December 31, 2018) were studied.
EXPOSURES Hospitals were divided into 5 groups based on the proportion of patients dually
enrolled, and penalties were assigned to the lowest-performing quartile of hospitals in each
group rather than the lowest-performing quartile overall.
MAIN OUTCOMES AND MEASURES Penalties in the prestratification vs poststratification

schemes.
RESULTS The study identified 3102 hospitals evaluated by the HACRP. Safety-net hospitals
received $111 333 384 in penalties before stratification compared with an estimated
$79 087 744 after stratification—a savings of $32 245 640. Hospitals less likely to receive
penalties after stratification included safety-net hospitals (33.6% penalized before
stratification vs 24.8% after stratification, Δ = –8.8 percentage points [pp], P < .001),
public hospitals (34.1% vs 30.5%, Δ = –3.6 pp, P = .003), hospitals in the West (26.8%
vs 23.2%, Δ = –3.6 pp, P < .001), hospitals in Medicaid expansion states (27.3% vs 25.6%,
Δ = –1.7 pp, P = .003), and hospitals caring for the most patients with disabilities (32.2% vs
28.3%, Δ = –3.9 pp, P < .001) and from racial/ethnic minority backgrounds (35.1% vs 31.5%,
Δ = –3.6 pp, P < .001). In multivariate analyses, safety-net status and treating patients with
highly medically complex conditions were associated with higher odds of moving from
penalized to nonpenalized status.
CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE This economic evaluation suggests that stratification of
hospitals would be associated with a narrowing of disparities in penalties and a marked
reduction in penalties for safety-net hospitals. Policy makers should consider adopting
stratification for the HACRP.
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s the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS)
implements value-based payment programs that reward or penalize hospitals based on the quality of care
they provide, establishing an equitable measure of quality becomes a critical aim. The Hospital-Acquired Condition Reduction Program (HACRP) is one such value-based payment program; it deducts 1% of Medicare payments from the quartile
of hospitals that perform the worst with respect to 6 measures of in-hospital infection and other adverse events (eg, standardized infection ratios for central catheter–associated bloodstream infection; catheter-associated urinary tract infection;
surgical site infection; methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus
aureus bacteremia; Clostridium difficile infection; and the
Patient Safety Indicator 90 (PSI-90), a claims-based composite of in-hospital safety events, such as blood clots and postoperative infections).1 The HACRP has been controversial, in
part because hospitals serving a greater proportion of patients from minority, low-socioeconomic, and other disadvantaged backgrounds, as well as those serving more patients with
medically complex conditions, are more likely to have worse
performance scores than the national benchmark and to receive penalties.2-4 The HACRP could thus exacerbate health care
inequities by withholding Medicare dollars from hospitals that
care for patients from the most vulnerable backgrounds.5
Understanding how to make the program more equitable
requires understanding what might drive differences in performance. Prior studies6-10 suggest that some disparities might
be attributable to differences in the underlying health and susceptibility of hospitals’ patient populations rather than differences in the quality of care delivered. The measures included
in the HACRP are adjusted for only a limited number of variables (eg, surgical site infection is adjusted for age, diabetes,
obesity, and surgical risk classification, and the other infection metrics are only adjusted for hospital-level covariates). The
models do not include most medical comorbidities or social
risk factors, such as Medicaid insurance status, which is associated with poverty, poorer health, and a higher burden of comorbidities that may predispose patients to infection and
which is an independent risk factor for catheter-associated urinary tract infections11 and surgical site infection.10 They also
do not include elements such as frailty and disability, which
are associated with adverse outcomes in the hospital and are
also more common among people with social risk factors, such
as poverty.12-14
Given similar disparities in other CMS value-based payfor-performance programs, including the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program (HRRP),6,15-17 many stakeholders
have argued for the inclusion of social risk adjustment when
evaluating hospital performance.5,18-20 In response, the US
Congress passed the 21st Century Cures Act in 2016. This act
mandates that hospitals in the HRRP be stratified into, and
evaluated within, quintiles based on their “proportion dual,”
which is the proportion of their patients dually enrolled in
Medicare and Medicaid. Dual eligibility has consistently been
reported to be an independent factor strongly associated with
adverse outcomes. Thus, evaluating performance within quintiles of proportion dual compares hospitals that serve patients with similar poverty and social risk levels. Under this new

For this economic evaluation, we used a variety of publicly
available data to compile information about the characteristics of hospitals, the patients they serve, and penalties incurred before stratification. For fiscal year 2020, the HACRP
evaluated hospitals on 6 benchmarks: the PSI-90, a claimsbased composite measure of the rate of 10 adverse outcomes
from July 1, 2016, through June 30, 2018; and the standardized infection ratios for 5 hospital-acquired infections
from January 1, 2017, through December 31, 2018 (eTable 1 in
the Supplement).1 We obtained hospitals’ PSI-90 score from
the performance period of July 1, 2016, to June 30, 2018, using
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Key Points
Question How would financial penalties change if hospitals in
the Hospital-Acquired Condition Reduction Program (HACRP)
were evaluated within 5 strata based on the proportion of their
patients who were dually enrolled in Medicare and Medicaid?
Findings In this economic evaluation using observational data
from 3177 hospitals from July 1, 2016, to December 31, 2018
(HACRP in fiscal year 2020), hospitals with the most dually
enrolled patients saw a collective savings of $32.2 million.
Hospitals less likely to receive penalties included those with the
most patients from minority backgrounds and the most patients
with disabilities.
Meaning Stratification was associated with a narrowing of
disparities and a decrease in penalties for safety-net hospitals;
policy makers should consider implementing stratification for
the HACRP as they have for similar value-based programs.

stratification policy in the HRRP, safety-net hospitals were
markedly more likely to see a reduction in penalties compared with the prestratification scheme, being assessed an
estimated $22 million less in penalties.17
The HACRP currently evaluates individual hospital performance compared with all hospitals’ performance nationally. Evaluating hospitals in the HACRP within peer groups
based on the proportion dual may represent a practical solution to addressing potential biases, if any, in the assessment
of hospital performance. However, the potential associations
of such a change with CMS penalties are unknown. This study
thus had 3 aims: to describe the characteristics of the hospitals penalized in the most recent year of the HACRP (fiscal year
2020); to simulate stratification by proportion dual and determine the association this might have with penalty rates for
key hospital groups of interest, including safety-net and teaching hospitals; and to calculate the change in financial penalties among these groups after stratification. Patient-level data
were used to calculate the proportion of, for example, Black
or Hispanic patients at a hospital. Those data contain personal health information although no patient names. This study
was approved by the Human Research Protection Office at
Washington University. The requirement for informed consent was waived by the Human Research Protection Office.

Methods
Data
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the CMS 2020 Hospital Compare Annual Files and calculated
their 5 standardized infection ratios from the 2017 and 2018
Hospital Compare Annual Files. We determined the penalization status of the hospitals (before stratification) using the 2020
Hospital Compare Annual Files.
From the HRRP Supplemental Data File21 from the CMS’s
Inpatient Prospective Payment System final rule for 2020, we
determined the percentage of each hospital’s patient base that
was dually enrolled in Medicare and Medicaid. We excluded
hospitals that did not have such data available, as well as hospitals in Maryland, which are exempt from the HACRP. We
linked hospital characteristics from the American Hospital
Association 2018 Annual Survey.22 We then used 100% of Medicare inpatient claims for admissions in 2017 to determine each
hospital’s proportion of Black patients, Hispanic patients, and
patients originally eligible for Medicare because of disability.
Race/ethnicity were defined according to the Medicare Master Beneficiary Summary File,23 which uses beneficiaries’ selfreported race/ethnicity at the time of Medicare enrollment,
treating race and ethnicity as a single variable rather than allowing both race and ethnicity to be recorded (eg, beneficiaries cannot be both Hispanic and Black or Hispanic and White).
We used the Area Deprivation Index for 9-digit zip codes, which
ranks neighborhoods by socioeconomic status disadvantage,
to estimate patient neighborhood characteristics24 and each
hospital’s case mix index (mean diagnosis related group weight
of inpatient discharges) to estimate medical complexity. We
used estimated 2017-2018 total Medicare inpatient payments
from the publicly available RAND Hospital Data tool, a directory of public cost reports based on the CMS’s Healthcare
Provider Cost Reporting Information System, to calculate
penalties.25

Simulating the Association of Stratification
by Proportion Dual With Penalization Status
We segmented our hospitals into 5 quintiles of proportion dual
by using the same stratification that the CMS uses for the HRRP.
For each hospital, following the CMS’s typical approach to assessing performance, we then winsorized the PSI-90 and the
5 standaardized infection ratio measures at the 5th and 95th
percentiles within each quintile, calculated z scores for each
of the 6 measures, applied an equal weight to each score, and
summed the contributions to obtain the total score. Within each
quintile, the worst-performing quartile of hospitals was tagged
for penalization. All analyses followed the latest HACRP
method26 but were performed within each quintile of proportion dual instead of within 1 national cohort. For the purposes of this article, we use the term safety-net hospitals to
refer to hospitals in the fifth quintile of proportion dual, caring for the highest proportion of patients dually enrolled in
Medicare and Medicaid.

Covariates
We evaluated the association of stratification with financial
penalties by several characteristics, including hospital size,
profit status (public, not for profit, or investor owned), teaching status, geography (Northeast, Midwest, South, or West),
rurality (urban or rural), and location within a Medicaidjamainternalmedicine.com
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expansion or non–Medicaid-expansion state. We categorized
hospitals in the top quintile of case-mix index, proportion of
patients with disability, and proportion of Black and Hispanic
patients as high complexity, high disability, and serving
populations from minority backgrounds, respectively. We
classified hospitals in neighborhoods in the top quintile of
Area Deprivation Index as those serving patients from the
most socioeconomically disadvantaged backgrounds (highdisadvantage hospitals).27

Outcome: Change in Penalties
We calculated penalties as deductions of 1% from the estimated total Medicare inpatient payments to the worstperforming quartile of hospitals, both within the national cohort (ie, before stratification) and within each quintile of dual
enrollment (after stratification). Our primary outcome was the
change in penalties levied between the prestratification and
poststratification schemes. We assessed these changes within
each quintile of dual enrollment and at the state level.

Statistical Analysis
We assessed baseline characteristics of hospitals evaluated by
the HACRP in fiscal year 2020. We then tested for association
between baseline characteristics and penalization status under the prestratification scheme using Pearson χ2 tests. We
repeated these analyses on the cohort of hospitals after stratification by proportion dual and subsequent assignment of penalties. At the level of each hospital characteristic, we tested
the percentage of change in penalization status under
the prestratification vs poststratification schemes using
the McNemar test. Last, we estimated (1) a logistic model to
calculate odds ratios (ORs) for change in status from penalized before stratification to nonpenalized after stratification
and (2) a similar multivariate logistic model, controlling for
hospital characteristics.
All analyses were conducted using Stata/IC software,
version 16.0 (StataCorp LLC). We considered a 2-tailed P < .05
to be statistically significant.

Results
Characteristics of Hospitals Evaluated by the HACRP
We identified 3102 hospitals evaluated by the HACRP in fiscal
year 2020 (Table 1). A total of 1952 hospitals (62.9%) were privately owned (nonprofit), whereas 420 (13.5%) were public
(government owned) and 705 (22.7%) were proprietary (for
profit). A total of 1272 hospitals (41.3%) were located in the
South. Hospitals were more often urban (2333 [75.8%]) and
in a state that had implemented Medicaid expansion by the
HACRP’s 2020 performance period (1757 [56.6%]). There
was an approximately even distribution of hospitals among
teaching status (teaching vs nonteaching) and size (small,
medium, or large).

Characteristics of Hospitals Penalized Before Stratification
We identified 774 hospitals that received a penalty in fiscal year
2020 (eTable 2 in the Supplement). A total of 207 (26.7%) of
(Reprinted) JAMA Internal Medicine Published online December 21, 2020

© 2020 American Medical Association. All rights reserved.

Downloaded From: https://jamanetwork.com/ by a Henry Ford Health System User on 02/10/2021

E3

Research Original Investigation

Association of Enrollment in Medicare and Medicaid With Penalties for Hospital-Acquired Conditions

Table 1. Characteristics of Hospitals Evaluated by the Hospital-Acquired
Condition Reduction Program in Fiscal Year 2020
No. (%)
(N = 3102)

Characteristic
Quintile of proportion dually enrolled
1 (Fewest dually enrolled patients)

621 (20.0)

2

624 (20.1)

3

618 (19.9)

4

622 (20.1)

5 (highest; considered safety net)

617 (19.9)

Teaching status
Nonteaching

1609 (52.3)

Teaching

1468 (47.7)

Size
Small

1081 (35.1)

Medium

943 (30.7)

Large

1053 (34.2)

Ownership
Public

420 (13.5)

Private, nonprofit (voluntary)

1952 (62.9)

Private, investor owned (proprietary)

705 (22.7)

Geographic location
Northeast

474 (15.4)

Midwest

720 (23.4)

South

1272 (41.3)

West

611 (19.9)

Rurality
Rural

744 (24.2)

Urban

2333 (75.8)

Medicaid expansion status

Characteristics of Hospitals Penalized
After Stratification
After stratifying and assessing hospitals within quintiles of proportion dual, we identified 771 hospitals that would receive
a penalty (eTable 3 in the Supplement). Our simulated stratification scheme was designed to penalize an equal proportion (the worst-performing quartile) of hospitals within each
quintile of proportion dually enrolled.
As in the prestratification scheme, the distributions of
several characteristics, including proportion of patients from
minority backgrounds, proportion of patients with disabilities, teaching status, size, and ownership, remained significantly different between the penalized and nonpenalized
hospitals. The distributions of other characteristics, including rurality, patient medical complexity, and neighborhood
disadvantage, did not differ significantly. In contrast to the
prestratification scheme, the distributions for geographic and
Medicaid expansion status characteristics did not remain
significantly different between the penalized and nonpenalized hospitals.

Nonexpansion state

1345 (43.4)

Expansion state

1757 (56.6)

Hospital Characteristics Associated With Penalization
Before vs After Stratification

Lower population from minority backgrounds

2483 (80.1)

High population from minority backgrounds

619 (20.0)

the penalized cohort were safety-net hospitals (in the fifth quintile of dual enrollment), whereas 97 (12.5%) were in the first
quintile of dual enrollment. The percentage of contribution to
the penalized cohort tended to increase with each successive
quintile of proportion dually enrolled: hospitals in the second quintile made up 19.6%, hospitals in the third quintile
made up 19.4%, and hospitals in the fourth quintile made up
21.7% of the penalized cohort (eTable 2 in the Supplement).
The difference in penalized proportions was unequal across
quintiles of dual enrollment (χ 24 = 54.91, P < .001).

At the level of each hospital characteristic, we compared the
proportion that received penalties under the prestratification and the poststratification schemes and assessed these differences for significance (Table 2). A total of 207 safety-net hospitals (33.6%) were penalized in the prestratification scheme
compared with 153 (24.8%) in the poststratification scheme.
This 8.8–percentage point (pp) change (Δ) was statistically significant (P < .001). In the poststratification scheme, hospitals in the first quintile of dual enrollment (ie, those caring for
the fewest dually enrolled patients) were most likely to change
from nonpenalized to penalized when the poststratification
scheme was used (Δ = +9.2 pp).
Compared with the prestratification scheme, hospitals that
were significantly less likely to receive penalties after stratification included facilities that were serving more patients from
minority backgrounds (Δ = –3.6 pp, P < .001), high disability
(Δ = –3.9 pp, P < .001), publicly owned (Δ = –3.6 pp, P = .003),
in the West (Δ = –3.6 pp, P < .001), and in Medicaidexpansion states (Δ = –1.6 pp, P = .003). Conversely, hospitals that were penalized in significantly greater proportions
included those in the South (Δ = +2.2 pp, P < .001) and in non–
Medicaid-expansion states (Δ = +1.9 pp, P = .001). No significant changes were observed in the proportions of hospitals
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Minority

Disability
Lower-disability population

2483 (80.1)

High-disability population

619 (20.0)

Case-mix index
Lower-complexity population

2487 (80.2)

High-complexity population

615 (19.8)

Area Deprivation Index

E4

The distributions of several characteristics, including proportion of patients in minority groups, proportion of patients
with disabilities, teaching status, size, ownership, geography, and Medicaid-expansion status, differed significantly
between the penalized and nonpenalized hospitals. For example, hospitals in states that had not expanded Medicaid
comprised 1050 (45.1%) of the nonpenalized cohort but
295 (38.1%) of the penalized cohort (P = .001).
In contrast, the distributions of other characteristics,
including rurality, patient medical complexity, and neighborhood disadvantage, were not found to differ significantly.

Lower socioeconomic disadvantage

2354 (76.5)

High socioeconomic disadvantage

723 (23.5)
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Table 2. Hospitals Penalized by Hospital Characteristic Before vs After Stratification
No. (%) of hospitalsa
Characteristic

Before
stratification

After
stratification

Change, %

P value

Total penalized

774 (25.0)

771 (24.8)

0.1

.81

1 (Fewest)

97 (15.6)

154 (24.8)

9.2

<.001

2

152 (24.4)

155 (24.8)

0.5

.41

3

150 (24.3)

154 (24.9)

0.6

.21

4

168 (27.0)

155 (24.9)

−2.1

.002

5 (Safety net)

207 (33.6)

153 (24.8)

−8.8

<.001

Nonteaching

364 (22.6)

362 (22.5)

−0.1

.83

Teaching

404 (27.5)

405 (27.6)

0.1

.91

Small

228 (21.1)

235 (21.7)

0.6

.40

Medium

241 (25.6)

242 (25.7)

0.1

.86

Large

299 (28.4)

290 (27.5)

−0.9

.22

Public

143 (34.1)

128 (30.5)

−3.6

.003

Private, nonprofit

478 (24.5)

486 (24.9)

0.4

.40

Private, investor owned

147 (20.8)

153 (21.7)

0.8

.33

Quintile of proportion dual

Teaching status

Size

Ownership

Geographic location
Northeast

138 (29.1)

131 (27.6)

−1.5

.07

Midwest

174 (24.2)

174 (24.2)

0

>.99

South

292 (23.0)

320 (25.2)

2.2

<.001

West

164 (26.8)

142 (23.2)

−3.6

<.001

Rurality
Rural

171 (23.0)

168 (22.6)

−0.4

.53

Urban

597 (25.6)

599 (25.7)

0.1

.86

Nonexpansion state

295 (21.9)

321 (23.9)

1.9

.001

Expansion state

479 (27.3)

450 (25.6)

−1.7

.003

Lower population from minority backgrounds

557 (22.4)

576 (23.2)

0.8

.10

High population from minority backgrounds

217 (35.1)

195 (31.5)

−3.6

<.001

Medicaid expansion status

Minority

Disability
Lower-disability population

575 (23.2)

596 (24.0)

0.8

.06

High-disability population

199 (32.2)

175 (28.3)

−3.9

<.001

Lower-complexity population

606 (24.4)

606 (24.4)

0

>.99

High-complexity population

168 (27.3)

165 (26.8)

−0.5

.63

Lower socioeconomic disadvantage

580 (24.6)

581 (24.7)

0

.93

High socioeconomic disadvantage

188 (26.0)

186 (25.7)

−0.3

.73

a

Case-mix index

Area Deprivation Index

penalized with respect to teaching status, size, rurality, patient medical complexity, or neighborhood disadvantage.
Finally, after controlling for other hospital characteristics, we found that hospitals in the fourth (adjusted OR, 7.55;
95% CI, 2.04-27.91; P = .002) and the fifth (adjusted OR, 26.61;
95% CI, 7.43-95.30; P < .001) quintiles of dual enrollment were
more likely to move from a penalized prestratification status
to a nonpenalized poststratification status compared with hospitals in the first quintile of dual enrollment (Table 3). Comjamainternalmedicine.com

Data are expressed as the number
(percentage) of each category that
was penalized before or after
stratification. For example,
207 safety-net hospitals (33.6% of
all safety-net hospitals) were
penalized in the prestratification
scheme compared with 153 (24.8%
of all safety-net hospitals) in the
poststratification scheme.

pared with those hospitals with patients with less medically
complex conditions, hospitals that care for patients with highly
medically complex conditions were more likely to see a status change from penalized to nonpenalized (adjusted OR, 2.26;
95% CI, 1.20-4.26; P = .01).

Changes in Financial Penalties Before vs After Stratification
We estimated a total of $393 297 761 levied in penalties in the
prestratification scheme, with safety-net hospitals (19.9%
(Reprinted) JAMA Internal Medicine Published online December 21, 2020
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Table 3. Associations Between Hospital Characteristics and Odds of Status Change From Penalized
(Before Stratification) to Nonpenalized (After Stratification)
No. (%)a

Univariate OR
(95% CI)

1 (Fewest)

4 (0.6)

1 [Reference]

NA

1 [Reference]

NA

2

5 (0.8)

1.25 (0.33-4.66)

.74

1.75 (0.38-8.14)

.47

3

3 (0.5)

0.75 (0.17-3.38)

.71

1.29 (0.25-6.67)

.76

4

15 (2.4)

3.81 (1.26-11.55)

.02

7.55 (2.04-27.91)

.002

5 (Safety net)

55 (8.9)

15.1 (5.44-41.92)

<.001

26.61 (7.43-95.30)

<.001

Nonteaching

42 (2.6)

1 [Reference]

NA

1 [Reference]

NA

Teaching

36 (2.5)

0.94 (0.60-1.47)

.78

0.55 (0.32-0.96)

.04

Small

31 (2.9)

1 [Reference]

NA

1 [Reference]

NA

Medium

16 (1.7)

0.58 (0.32-1.08)

.08

0.51 (0.27-0.97)

.04

Large

31 (2.9)

1.03 (0.62-1.70)

.92

0.79 (0.44-1.39)

.41

Public

20 (4.8)

2.15 (1.10-4.20)

.03

1.85 (0.90-3.82)

.10

Private, nonprofit

42 (2.2)

0.95 (0.53-1.70)

.85

1.05 (0.55-2.01)

.88

Private, investor owned

16 (2.3)

1 [Reference]

NA

1 [Reference]

NA

Northeast

11 (2.3)

0.93 (0.43-1.98)

.84

0.51 (0.23-1.16)

.11

Midwest

18 (2.5)

1 [Reference]

NA

1 [Reference]

NA

South

16 (1.3)

0.5 (0.25-0.98)

.04

0.51 (0.22-1.21)

.13

West

33 (5.4)

2.23 (1.24-4.00)

.01

0.91 (0.45-1.83)

.79

Characteristic

Multivariate OR
P value (95% CI)

P value

Quintile of proportion dual

Teaching status

Size

Ownership

Geographic location

Rurality
Rural

13 (1.8)

0.62 (0.34-1.13)

.12

0.6 (0.29-1.25)

.17

Urban

65 (2.8)

1 [Reference]

NA

1 [Reference]

NA

Nonexpansion state

19 (1.4)

1 [Reference]

NA

1 [Reference]

NA

Expansion state

63 (3.6)

2.6 (1.55-4.36)

<.001

1.5 (0.68-3.30)

.31

Low population from
minority backgrounds

56 (2.3)

1 [Reference]

NA

1 [Reference]

NA

High population from
minority backgrounds

26 (4.2)

1.9 (1.18-3.05)

.01

0.71 (0.40-1.27)

.25

Medicaid expansion status

Minority

Disability
Low-disability population

51 (2.1)

1 [Reference]

NA

1 [Reference]

NA

High-disability population

31 (5.0)

2.51 (1.59-3.96)

<.001

1.19 (0.69-2.08)

.53

Low-complexity
population

61 (2.5)

1 [Reference]

NA

1 [Reference]

NA

High-complexity
population

21 (3.4)

1.41 (0.85-2.33)

.19

2.26 (1.20-4.26)

.01

Low socioeconomic
disadvantage

60 (2.6)

1 [Reference]

NA

1 [Reference]

NA

High socioeconomic
disadvantage

18 (2.5)

0.98 (0.57-1.66)

.93

0.92 (0.51-1.64)

.77

Case mix index

a

Area Deprivation Index
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Abbreviations: NA, not applicable;
OR, odds ratio.
These data are expressed as
number (percentage) of each
category that changed from
penalized before stratification to
nonpenalized after stratification.
For example, 55 safety-net hospitals
(8.9% of all safety-net hospitals)
that were penalized in the
prestratification scheme were not
penalized in the poststratification
scheme.

of the cohort) receiving 28.3% of all penalties—a total of
$111 333 384 in penalties. After stratification, we estimated a
total of $385 763 404 in penalties, with safety-net hospitals receiving 20.5% of all penalties ($79 087 744)—a savings of
$32 245 640 from the prestratification scheme (Figure 1). Hospitals in the first quintile of proportion dual were assessed an

additional $18 150 776 in penalties after stratification, bearing 8.6% of all penalties before stratification and 13.4% of all
penalties afterward.
We further assessed changes in penalties at the state level
(Figure 2). Fewer hospitals in the West were penalized after
stratification, whereas those in the South were more likely to
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be penalized. Hospitals in California saw the greatest reduction in total penalties (–$17 231 376), whereas those in Florida
saw the greatest increase ($5 297 138).
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Figure 1. Change in Total Penalties per Quintile of Proportion
of Patients Dually Enrolled in Medicare and Medicaid
25 000

In line with previous work, this economic evaluation found that,
in fiscal year 2020, the HACRP disproportionately penalized
hospitals that were large, publicly owned, teaching, in the
Northeast, and in Medicaid-expansion states, as well as those
caring for high proportions of patients with disabilities and from
racial/ethnic minority backgrounds. To our knowledge, however, this is the first study to simulate the association of social
risk stratification with financial penalties levied by the HACRP.
After evaluation within peer groups of proportion dual, hospitals that were significantly less likely to receive penalties included those that were publicly owned; in the West; in Medicaid-expansion states; and caring for the highest proportions
of patients with medical complexity, with disabilities, and from
racial/ethnic minority backgrounds. The study found that stratification on the basis of proportion dual was associated with
a considerable change in penalties. Safety-net hospitals saw a
$32 million reduction in penalties, whereas hospitals caring for
the fewest patients dually enrolled in Medicare and Medicaid
faced an additional $18 million in penalties. At the state level,
the difference in penalties was most striking for California hospitals, which were assessed $17 million less in penalties after
stratification by proportion dually enrolled.
Furthermore, these findings suggest that stratification
would keep the HACRP roughly budget neutral with respect
to its prestratification status, with $393 million assessed in penalties before stratification and $386 million assessed after stratification. This is in part because the HACRP is designed so that
the hospitals with the worst performance statistics are financially penalized regardless of their absolute performance; if all
hospitals reduced hospital-acquired conditions by half, there
would be no change in penalties.
One potential critique of stratification in the HACRP is that
safety-net hospitals may do more poorly under the program
because they have fewer resources, perform less quality improvement work, or otherwise provide less-safe inpatient care,
and the data used in this study can neither support nor refute
that concern. However, stratification would not let any hospitals off the hook per se; it would simply acknowledge that
underlying differences in patient population that impact susceptibility to infection and other adverse in-hospital outcomes need to be accounted for. Safety-net hospitals would
still have strong incentive to reduce adverse events but would
be more fairly judged against other facilities with a more similar case mix. Further, prior work5,20,28,29 has found that the
HACRP has not yet achieved its goal: the receipt of a penalty
has not been associated with a change in the rate of hospitalacquired conditions or in patient outcomes. The HACRP as currently constructed could therefore inadvertently serve an institutionalized function of penalizing the safety net while also
failing to adequately support and catalyze improvement in
patient outcomes.
jamainternalmedicine.com
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These findings suggest that stratifying hospitals in the
HACRP by patient social risk is not only practical but also sensible and equitable. Safety-net hospitals, which have low operating margins and rely on volatile, nonclinical sources of
revenue to offset costs, are disproportionately affected by
value-based payment programs, as are the patients they serve.
Stratification of the HACRP provides substantial financial relief for the safety net while narrowing disparities among the
hospitals selected for and spared from penalization. This reduction in financial burden may contribute to investment in
resources that may improve the quality of care provided by
safety-net hospitals, which, compared with their non–safetynet counterparts, serve greater percentages of racial/ethnic
minorities and patients with low income.30
However, the current study found that disparities in
penalties still existed after stratification and assessment by
proportion dual. The proportion of patients from minority
backgrounds; the proportion of patients with disabilities;
and hospital teaching status, size, and ownership were associated with significant differences between the penalized
and nonpenalized cohorts in the prestratification and poststratification schemes. More work is necessary to identify
the multifactorial causes, including hospital resources,
access, surveillance bias, discrimination, and structural racism, that underlie the racial and socioeconomic disparities in
hospital capacity, patient risk profile, and hospital-acquired
conditions and infections.31,32 Understanding such factors
may lead to improvement in patient care, outcomes, and
risk adjustment and establishment of a truly equitable measure of quality in the HACRP and other value-based payment
programs.

Limitations
This study has limitations. First, it evaluated only 1 year of
penalties (based on 2 years of performance data) in the
HACRP. Second, the study used publicly available data from
the CMS, including measures derived from the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, which calculates standardized infection ratios by dividing the number of observed
(Reprinted) JAMA Internal Medicine Published online December 21, 2020
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Figure 2. Change in Total Penalties at the State Level (Excluding Alaska and Hawaii)

Net change, $

After stratification, states that each
received a total of less than $1 million
in penalties compared with the
prestratification scheme included
California, Massachusetts, Michigan,
and New York; states that each
received a total of $1 million or more
in penalties included Arkansas,
Florida, Kansas, Kentucky,
Mississippi, Ohio, Texas, and Virginia.

1 000 000 to 5 297 138
300 001 to 999 999
15 001 to 300 000
0 to 15 000
–999 999 to –1
–17 231 376 to –1 000 000
Maryland hospitals exempt
from the HACRP

infections by the number of predicted infections; the
denominator is calculated using multivariate regression
models generated from nationally aggregated data. The
impact of using standardized infection ratios recalculated
with multivariate regression models generated from quintiles based on proportion dual or another marker of social
risk is a direction for future research. Third, the study was
able to estimate changes in financial penalties by using historic Medicare inpatient payments to each hospital; an even
more accurate account of financial changes will depend on
billing updates in fiscal year 2020. Fourth, although among
Medicare beneficiaries the variability in Medicaid eligibility
is much smaller than for the general public, the proportion
of each hospital’s Medicare patients who are enrolled in
Medicaid varies somewhat according to Medicaid expansion
status. Although the US Congress made the choice to use this
parameter to stratify the HRRP in the 21st Century Cures Act,
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passed in 2016, positing that it was the best way to identify
patients with likely high levels of social need using claims
data, it introduced state-to-state variability that is not perfectly tied to the actual amount of need in each hospital.

Conclusions
This study found that stratification of hospitals in the
HACRP by quintiles of proportion dual was associated with a
narrowing of some disparities between penalized and nonpenalized hospitals. Safety-net hospitals saw a marked
reduction in penalties, with an estimated total savings of
more than $32 million. Policy makers and the CMS should
consider adopting stratification by proportion dual when
assessing hospital performance in the HACRP as they have
for the HRRP.
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